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NO RUBBER STAMP:
HEGEL’S CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCH
Thom Brooks1
Abstract: Perhaps one of the most controversial aspects of Hegel’s Philosophy of
Right for contemporary interpreters is its discussion of the constitutional monarch.
This is true despite the general agreement amongst virtually all interpreters that
Hegel’s monarch is no more powerful than modern constitutional monarchs and is an
institution worthy of little attention or concern. In this article, I will examine whether
or not it matters who is the monarch and what domestic and foreign powers he has. I
argue against the virtual consensus of recent interpreters that Hegel’s monarch is far
more powerful than has been understood previously. In part, Hegel’s monarch is per-
haps even more powerful than Hegel himself may have realized and I will demonstrate
certain inconsistencies with some of his claims. My reading represents a distinctive
break from the virtual consensus, without endorsing the view that Hegel was a
totalitarian.
I
Introduction
Perhaps one of the most controversial aspects of G.W.F. Hegel’s Philosophy
of Right2 for contemporary interpreters is its discussion of the constitutional
monarch [der konstitutionell Monarch].3 This is true despite the general
agreement amongst virtually all interpreters that Hegel’s monarch is no
more powerful than modern constitutional monarchies, such as those found in
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. Vol. XXVIII. No. 1. Spring 2007
1 Department of Politics, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU.
Email: t.brooks@newcastle.ac.uk
2 See G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Vol. 7, ed. Eva
Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main, 1970) (hereafter ‘PR’).
Unless stated otherwise, all English translations will be from G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of
the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1991).
Remarks will be noted by ‘R’ and additions by ‘A’ following the appropriate paragraph
number.
3 It should be noted that some commentators believe that Hegel offers distinctly dif-
ferent treatments of the justification and powers of the constitutional monarch in his Phi-
losophy of Right and other writings, most notably Karl-Heinz Ilting. However, I agree
with the work of Jean-Philippe Deranty, which clearly demonstrates that these seem-
ingly different treatments of the monarch (as well as other state institutions) in Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right and additional writings compliment each other in one coherent
vision. (See Jean-Philippe Deranty, ‘Hegel’s Parliamentarianism: A New Perspective on
Hegel’s Theory of Political Institutions’, Owl of Minerva, 32 (2001), pp. 107–33;
Karl-Heinz Ilting, ‘The Structure of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right” ’, in Hegel’s Politi-
cal Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives, ed. Z.A. Pelczynski (Cambridge, 1971), pp.
90–110; and Thom Brooks, Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the
Philosophy of Right (Edinburgh, 2007).)
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Britain.4 This common view has only recently come into vogue, as Hegel’s
monarch had long been seen as evidence of Hegel’s defence of the reactionary
Prussian authority of his time. The view of Hegel as a reactionary was put for-
ward most forcefully (and famously) by Karl Popper in his The Open Society
and Its Enemies.5 He not only claimed that Hegel was ‘an apologist for Prus-
sian absolutism’, but that Hegel is the father of modern totalitarianism.6 This
reading of Hegel has now been discredited, due in large part to the work of
T.M. Knox,7 and not least because of various liberal characteristics of the
state that Hegel defends which were not features of the Prussia of his time,
such as the use of jury trials and representative institutions, as well as the eli-
gibility of all citizens for civil service.8
Despite this general agreement, many commentators find Hegel’s defence
of the constitutional monarch a great weakness in his account of the state, calling
it ‘arbitrary’, ‘beset with contradictions’, ‘bizarre’, ‘comical’, ‘implausible’,
‘obscure’, ‘troubling’, ‘unconvincing’, ‘unusual’, ‘wide of the mark’, and
even worse.9 Famously, Marx called Hegel’s defence of the monarch the
92 T. BROOKS
4 One notable exception is Renato Cristi who alone argues that Hegel endorses an
absolute monarchy, albeit a monarchy not ‘bent on tyrannizing civil society and its mem-
bers’. (See F.R. Cristi, ‘The Hegelsche Mitte and Hegel’s Monarch’, Political Theory, 11
(1983), pp. 601–22.) Karl Marx also believed Hegel endorsed an absolute monarchy.
(See Karl Marx, Early Political Writings, ed. and trans. Joseph O’Malley with Richard
A. Davis (Cambridge, 1994), p. 18.)
5 See Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies. Vol II: The High Tide of
Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath (London, 5th edn., 1966). Also see Rudolf
Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit (Berlin, 1857), pp. 357–91 and Bertrand Russell, A History
of Western Philosophy (New York, 1945), p. 742.
6 Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, pp. 34, 22. See ibid., p. 47: ‘The book is
pure apologetics. By its appeal to the wisdom of Providence it offers an apology for the
excellence of Prussian monarchism; by its appeal to the excellence of Prussian monar-
chism it offers an apology for the wisdom of Providence.’ Herbert Marcuse agrees with
Popper that Hegel does glorify the Prussian monarchy, although he does not think
Hegel’s views are consistent with totalitarianism. (See Herbert Marcuse, Reason and
Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (London, 2nd edn. [1941], 1955), pp.
216, 218.)
7 See T.M. Knox, ‘Hegel and Prussianism’, in Hegel’s Political Philosophy, ed. Walter
Kaufmann (New York, 1970), pp. 13–29. See also Shlomo Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of
the Modern State (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 185–9; E.F. Carritt, ‘Reply’, in Hegel’s Politi-
cal Philosophy, ed. Kaufmann, pp. 30–43; E.F. Carritt, ‘Final Rejoinder’, in ibid., pp.
48–52; T.M. Knox, ‘Rebuttal’, in ibid., pp. 44–7; and Z.A. Pelczynski, ‘Hegel’s Political
Philosophy: Some Thoughts on Its Contemporary Relevance’, in Hegel’s Political Phi-
losophy, ed. Pelczynski, pp. 230–5.
8 See PR, §§227A and 228R (on jury trials), 291 (on civil service), and 298–320 (on
the Estates).
9 See Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, p. 187; Michael O. Hardimon,
Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge, 1994), p. 215;
Steven V. Hicks, International Law and the Possibility of a Just World Order: An Essay
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HEGEL’S CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCH 93
place where his ‘logical pantheistic mysticism is clearly evident’.10 Since
Marx’s critique, Hegel has normally been criticized for using his speculative
logic to justify the necessary existence of a monarch in the just state. Most
commentators tend to view Hegel’s monarch as not only a strange feature of
his Philosophy of Right, but as an overly obscure figure of no real impor-
tance.11 This common perspective is captured well by Michael Hardimon:
Virtually no one today finds Hegel’s arguments for [the monarch] to be
compelling. However, if one’s concern is with the distribution of power in
Hegel’s political state, as well it might be, the proper source of worry is not
the monarchy, whose powers are rather restricted, but rather the bureau-
cracy, the real seat of power in the modern political state as Hegel repre-
sents it.12
As a result, many understand the monarch as an institution worthy of little
attention or concern. This view has become increasingly controversial due to
more recent commentators who take a contrary position, arguing that there is,
in fact, ‘nothing paradoxical or confused about Hegel’s defense of monar-
on Hegel’s Universalism (Amsterdam, 1999), p. 173; Sidney Hook, ‘Hegel and his Apol-
ogists’, in Hegel’s Political Philosophy, ed. Kaufmann, p. 90; Dudley Knowles, Hegel
and the Philosophy of Right (London, 2002), p. 327; Michael Levin and Howard
Williams, ‘Inherited Power and Popular Representation: A Tension in Hegel’s Political
Theory’, Political Studies, 35 (1987), p. 114; Z.A. Pelczynski, ‘The Hegelian Concep-
tion of the State’, in Hegel’s Political Philosophy, ed. Pelczynski, p. 25; Pelczynski,
‘Hegel’s Political Philosophy’, p. 231; Leo Rauch, ‘Hegel, Spirit, and Politics’, in The
Age of German Idealism, ed. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (London,
1993), p. 285; Hugh A. Reyburn, The Ethical Theory of Hegel: A Study of the Philosophy
of Right (Oxford, 1921), p. 252; Steven B. Smith, Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism: Rights
in Context (Chicago, 1989), p. 152; and Mark Tunick, ‘Hegel’s Justification of Heredi-
tary Monarchy’, History of Political Thought, XII (1991), p. 482.
10 Marx, Early Political Writings, p. 1. See George Sabine, A History of Political
Theory (New York, 3rd edn., 1961), p. 663.
11 In his highly informative A Hegel Dictionary, Michael Inwood surprisingly does
not include an entry for the monarch, saying no more than ‘[The monarch] has the final
decision in the appointment of executives and in acts of state such as the declaration of
war, but his decisions are guided by expert advice. He is not an absolute, but a constitu-
tional monarch.’ This scant treatment is evidence of the general lack of importance often
attributed to the monarch by contemporary commentators. (See Michael Inwood, A
Hegel Dictionary (Oxford, 1992), p. 279. See also Bernard Yack, ‘The Rationality of
Hegel’s Concept of Monarchy’, American Political Science Review, 74 (1980), p. 715:
‘it seems that the constitution is a monarchy only in name, while, in fact, it is a bureau-
cracy, the rule of public officials’.)
12 Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, p. 215 (emphasis added). See Allen W.
Wood, ‘Introduction’, in PR, p. xxiv: ‘Hegel plainly intends real political power to be in
the hands neither of the prince nor of the people, but of an educated class of professional
civil servants’ and Pelczynski, ‘Hegel’s Political Philosophy’, p. 234.
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chy’.13 These recent arguments are based on alternative justificatory strate-
gies, rather than those which are explicitly endorsed by Hegel, in an attempt to
make his defence seem more plausible to modern readers.14
In this article, I will argue first that Hegel’s justification of the constitu-
tional monarch is established with the use of his logic. I will turn my attention
next to the question of whether or not it matters who serves as the monarch. I
will then examine the domestic and foreign powers of the monarch. I argue
against the virtual consensus of recent interpreters that Hegel’s monarch is far
more powerful than has been understood previously. In part, Hegel’s mon-
arch is perhaps even more powerful than Hegel himself may have realized and
I will demonstrate certain inconsistencies with some of his claims. My inter-
pretation represents a distinctive break from the virtual consensus on Hegel’s
monarch, without endorsing the view that Hegel was a totalitarian.
II
Hegel’s Justification of the Monarch
Hegel justifies monarchy on unique grounds. He does not endorse the classic
defence of monarchy, the divine right of kings.15 Nor does he follow Thomas
Hobbes and argue that prudential considerations regarding defence from
invasion and individuals in society from one another might justify rule by a sin-
gle sovereign.16 Instead, Hegel establishes his justification in his speculative
94 T. BROOKS
13 Peter J. Steinberger, Logic and Politics: Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (New Haven,
1988), p. 222. See Tunick, ‘Hegel’s Justification of Hereditary Monarchy’, pp. 481–96
and Yack, ‘The Rationality of Hegel’s Concept of Monarchy’, pp. 711, 716.
14 See Brooks, Hegel’s Political Philosophy.
15 The classic justification of monarchy is the divine right theory of kings as put for-
ward by Sir Robert Filmer is his Patriarcha. He argues that the rule of a monarch best
ensures the liberty of his people (Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, ed.
Johann P. Sommerville (Cambridge, 1991), p. 4). In addition, Filmer claims that the right
of kings to rule descends from the fact that God gave Adam dominion over the world.
Since Adam, kings rule their people as a father has authority over his children. Filmer
says: ‘To confirm this natural right of regal power, we find in the decalogue that the law
which enjoins obedience to kings is delivered in terms of “honour thy father” as if all
power were originally in the father’ (ibid., pp. 11–12). In addition, he claims that the
apparent absence of other forms of government from any mention in the Bible further
supports the view that God sanctions the existence of monarchy alone (ibid., pp. 7, 23).
The classic refutation of Filmer’s Patriarcha is John Locke’s The First Treatise on Gov-
ernment where he argues that in Patriarcha ‘there was never so much glib nonsense put
together in well sounding English’ (John Locke, Two Treatises on Government, ed. Mark
Goldie (London, 1993), p. 3).
16 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge [1651], 1996), pp.
117–21 [Chapter 17]. Nor does Hegel claim the monarch is justified on the grounds that
he fulfils some ‘symbolic role’ the monarchy might play for citizens. I therefore disagree
with Terry Pinkard. (See Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Rea-
son (Cambridge, 1994), p. 328 and Alan Brudner, ‘Constitutional Monarchy as the
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logic.17 He is very explicit about this: ‘With the organization of the state
(which in this case means constitutional monarchy), the one thing which we
must bear in mind is the internal necessity of the Idea: all other considerations
are irrelevant.’18 Therefore, Hegel’s views are the very opposite of Hobbes’s
position, as prudential and consequentialist considerations are not at the heart
of Hegel’s justification of the monarch.19 However, this is not to say there is
an absence of any resulting prudential benefits from having a monarchy.
Indeed, we may well discover that there are such benefits in support of it.
Nevertheless, for our purposes here, Hegel’s position is simply that nothing
other than the Idea’s logical development should be brought to bear on the
proper organization of the state which entails that the state must have a mon-
arch at its head. My intention in this section is to contrast my reading of
Hegel’s justification of the monarch with competing interpretations in the lit-
erature, rather than to make a case that the monarchy as Hegel understood it
should be a part of contemporary institutions.
Most commentators on the Philosophy of Right find Hegel’s justification
particularly obscure. Some even go so far as to claim that there is none to be
found at all, saying that Hegel’s monarch ‘simply exists, without the need of
further proof to ground his existence’.20 For these reasons, hardly anyone
today finds Hegel’s justification of the monarch persuasive and much of its
criticism is rather harsh. For example, Dudley Knowles says:
So [Hegel] rolls out a ramshackle constitutional structure, continuously
drawing readers’ attention to its ‘rational’ credentials. Thus, to take a comi-
cal example, it is not its utility in preventing the formation of conflicting
factions which justifies the practice of hereditary succession to the monar-
chy — such a consideration would demean the majesty of the monarch.
Rather it is the fact that the will of the state as expressed in the monarchy is
‘simple and therefore an immediate individuality [Einzelheit], so that the
determination of naturalness is inherent in its very concept’ . . . Marx sees
through this self-serving nonsense . . . Even to endorse the credentials of a
hereditary monarch following free-ranging reflection at a dinner party is to
Divine Regime: Hegel’s Theory of the Just State’, History of Political Thought, II
(1981), p. 127.)
17 Perhaps one of the better treatments of Hegel’s justification of the monarch — as it
takes Hegel’s logic into account — is Alan Brudner, ‘Constitutional Monarchy as the
Divine Regime’, pp. 119–40 and Brooks, Hegel’s Political Philosophy, Chapter VII.
18 PR, §279A (translation modified) (emphasis added).
19 My view is thus contra Pelczynski’s claim that ‘[a]part from an obscure meta-
physical argument . . . Hegel can only justify his preference for monarchical sovereignty
on the not very strong grounds of expediency’ (Pelczynski, ‘Hegel’s Political Philoso-
phy’, p. 231). Prudential reasons do appear in Hegel’s account, but it is the so-called ‘ob-
scure metaphysical argument’ that does the primary work on the question of why, for
Hegel, the rational state must be a monarchy, as I will demonstrate in this section.
20 See Cristi, ‘The Hegelsche Mitte and Hegel’s Monarch’, p. 618.
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demean the majesty of the institution. Only the speculative method will
serve — and it serves up a dish so dreadful that it discredits the method.21
Indeed, Knowles is far from alone in his dissatisfaction with Hegel’s argu-
ments.22 For example, Herbert Marcuse claims that Hegel is guilty of ‘betray-
ing his highest philosophical ideas’.23
I do not believe that the importance of logic in Hegel’s justification of the
monarch need be itself particularly problematic. Hegel states quite clearly in
his preface to the Philosophy of Right that he has ‘presupposed’ that his read-
ers would have a prior familiarity with his logic.24 This is hardly surprising:
after all, the Philosophy of Right was never intended to be read as a freestand-
ing work, independently of Hegel’s system of speculative philosophy.25
Hegel presents this philosophical system in his three-volume Encyclopaedia
of the Philosophical Sciences, divided into Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and
Philosophy of Spirit.26 Much of his life’s work was spent elaborating on dif-
ferent parts of this system and the Philosophy of Right is no exception: it is an
elaboration of ‘objective spirit’ in the third volume, the Philosophy of Spirit.27
96 T. BROOKS
21 Knowles, Hegel and the Philosophy of Right, p. 327 (emphasis given).
22 It might appear that Hegel does, in fact, justify hereditary monarchy as a way of
preventing the formation of factions. However, this reading is not supported by Hegel in
PR at §281R: ‘If the mode of succession is clearly defined — i.e., if the throne is inher-
ited — the formation of factions is prevented when the throne falls vacant; this circum-
stance has long been cited, and rightly so, in support of hereditary succession. Neverthe-
less, this aspect is merely a consequence, and if it is made into a ground [Grund], it
debases [the monarch’s] majesty to the sphere of ratiocination . . . [grounding] it not upon
the Idea of the state which is immanent within it, but on something outside it.’ (Emphasis
given.) It does seem true that Hegel does, in fact, argue that the justification of the heredi-
tary monarch is further supported by the fact that factions are prevented, however it is
important to note that this is not, in fact, the monarchy’s primary justification.
23 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 218. Karl Marx believes that Hegel’s mon-
arch is ‘the actual incarnation of the Idea’ (Marx, Early Political Writings, p. 5 (empha-
sis given)).
24 See PR, Preface p. 10 and §2R.
25 See PR, Preface, pp. 9–10.
26 These three parts of the system are now published as G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclo-
paedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze,
trans. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting and H.S. Harris (Indianapolis, 1991); G.W.F. Hegel,
Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature: Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sci-
ences (1830) Translated from Nicolin and Pöggeler’s Edition (1959) and from the
Zusätze in Michelet’s Text (1847), trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford, 1970); and G.W.F. Hegel,
Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind: Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sci-
ences (1830) Together with the Zusätze in Boumann’s Text (1845), trans. William
Wallace and A.V. Miller (Oxford, 1971).
27 The section ‘objective spirit’ is found at Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §§483–552.
On Hegel’s claim that his Philosophy of Right is an elaboration of ‘objective spirit’ and,
thus, to be understood as part of his philosophical system, see Hegel, PR, §§2R, 3R, 4R,
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Hegel’s understanding of logic and its application in his system resists easy
characterization. However, it is not so arcane and complex as to resist a brief
explanation. Hegel’s discussion of the structure of rationality is presented in
his views on logic and this logic grounds his philosophical system.28 For
Hegel, philosophy is a project concerned with a rationalist understanding of
the world. For example, he believes that in order to find the best justification
or value of something we must ascertain its ‘rationality’.29 Thus, he character-
izes the Philosophy of Right in the following way: ‘This treatise, in so far as it
deals with political science, shall be nothing other than an attempt to compre-
hend and portray the state as an inherently rational entity.’30 Hegel’s logic is
brought to bear on his political philosophy in that the logic provides our key to
understanding the state ‘as an inherently rational entity’.31
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel’s logic makes explicit the immanent
development of reason towards ‘freedom and truth’ as ‘the Idea’ [Idee],32 that
is, the ‘unity’ of a rational concept [Begriff] with its reality.33 Hegel fittingly
refers to his treatment of the monarch as ‘the Idea of the monarch’ [die Idee
des Monarchen].34 This treatment is not of any monarch in particular, but only
of its rational justification and place within the organization of the state. For
Hegel, this ‘Idea’ must take shape as universality, particularity and individu-
ality, as he believes he has demonstrated previously in his logic.35 In this case,
the Idea takes shape as a particular individual with universal powers: the
7R, 8R, 26R, 31, R, 33R, 34R, 48R, 57R, 78, 88, 95, 148R, 161, 163R, 181, 256R, 258R,
270R, 278, 279R, 280R, 281R, 302R and 324R. Note that most of the references to his
logic and system are made in his revised ‘remarks’ in later editions of the Philosophy of
Right. There is no doubt, however, about how Hegel wanted readers to understand the
Philosophy of Right: that is, as part of his system of speculative philosophy developed
from his Logic.
28 Hegel’s logic is presented in outline form in his The Encyclopaedia Logic. A more
fleshed out version is found in his Hegel’s Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (Amherst,
1969).
29 See Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 216.
30 PR, Preface, p. 21.
31 See Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic, §6R: ‘we have to presuppose that the reader has
enough education to know . . . what is there is partly appearance and only partly actual-
ity . . . a contingent existence does not deserve to be called something-actual in the
emphatic sense of the word; what contingently exists has no greater value than that which
something-possible has; it is an existence which (although it is) can just as well not be.
But when I speak of actuality, one should, of course, think about the sense in which I use
this expression, given the fact that I dealt with actuality too in a quite elaborate [Science
of] Logic’ (emphasis given).
32 See Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 37. See PR, §2.
33 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 587.
34 See PR, §281A. Indeed, Hegel calls the application of his logic the ‘animating
soul’ (Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic, §24A2).
35 See PR, §§273R, 279R, A, 281.
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monarch.36 The monarch is thus thought to unify universality, particularity
and individuality.
However, there is more to the justification of the monarch than this — oth-
erwise, it may look like critics, such as Marx, have been correct to say Hegel’s
monarch is simply an ‘incarnation of the Idea’.37 The progressive develop-
ment of the Idea is, firstly, a development of reason. For Hegel, the monarch is
justifiable because its rationality follows necessarily from the previous devel-
opments of reason. Hegel is therefore able to claim ‘[t]he monarchical consti-
tution is therefore the constitution of developed reason’, as the monarch
represents an advance in the progression of reason.38 Such an advance is not
made simply with respect to ‘reason’ alone, as such, but, within the context of
the Philosophy of Right, the rational development of the freedom of the will.39
This development acquires a certain shape and structure through the course of
the Philosophy of Right in broad terms, such as the three spheres of ‘abstract
right’, ‘morality’ and ‘ethical life’, but also in the structures internal to these
three spheres, such as in the state’s separation of powers into ‘the power of the
sovereign’, ‘the executive power’ and ‘the Estates’.40 For Hegel, these divi-
sions of the Philosophy of Right embody the structure of freedom in the state,
98 T. BROOKS
36 See G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First
Philosophy of Right: Heidelberg 1817–1818 with Additions from the Lectures of
1818–1819, trans. J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley, 1995) (hereafter
‘LNR’), §§137, R, 138, R.
37 See Marx, Early Political Writings, p. 5.
38 See Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §542. Hegel says that ‘the business of our science’
is ‘the rationality of right’, ‘a philosophical science of the state [philosophischer
Wissenschaft des Staats]’ (PR, Preface pp. 14A, 17).
39 PR, §4, A: ‘The ground [Boden] of right is the realm of spirit in general and its pre-
cise location and starting point [Ausgangspunkt] is the will; the will is free, so that free-
dom constitutes its substance and destiny [Bestimmung] and the system of right is the
realm of realized freedom [wirklichten Freiheit] . . . that which is free is the will. Will
without freedom is an empty word, just as freedom is actual only as will or as subject’
(translation modified) (emphasis given). See Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §484: ‘the pur-
posive action of the will is to realize its concept, freedom [die Freiheit], in these exter-
nally objective aspects, making the latter a world moulded by the former, which in it is
thus at home with itself . . . the concept accordingly perfected to the Idea. Freedom,
shaped into the actuality of a world, receives the form of Necessity’ (translation modi-
fied). See also PR, §§31, R, 32, R, A.
40 See LNR, §§131, R and Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §541R. Perhaps interestingly,
Hegel did not believe the judiciary formed an independent branch of government.
Instead, the judiciary is seen as part of the executive because the executive’s duties are to
apply the universal in particular (and often contingent) cases. (See Hegel, PR, §§272A,
287, 290A.) For the view that Hegel’s separation of powers is instead between the ‘legis-
lative, executive, and judicial’ branches, which I would dispute, see Stephen Houlgate,
Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy (London, 1991),
p. 124.)
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HEGEL’S CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCH 99
a structure that takes the shape of a constitutional monarchy.41 The state con-
stitutes ‘freedom in its most concrete shape’ when it possesses these struc-
tures.42
Likewise, for Hegel, the monarch represents not only an institution justi-
fied by logic, but also an institution within logic’s rational, developmental
structure that helps to best cultivate freedom in the state.43 Hegel claims there
are two specific ways in which the monarch does just this.44 Firstly, the state
can be conceived as nothing more than an aggregate of competing interests
41 See PR, §§273, R, A, 275, A, 279,R.
42 PR, §33A.
43 See PR, §§273, R, 279R. See Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §544: ‘The true differ-
ence of [other forms of government] from genuine monarchy depends on the true value
of those principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarantee in
the state-power. These principles are those expounded earlier, liberty of property, and
above all personal liberty, civil society, with its industry and its communities, and the
regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subordination to the laws. ’
44 Bernard Yack argues that here Hegel cannot be correct. Yack says: ‘Hegel’s logic
cannot teach us the rational necessity of hereditary monarchy. We can learn about it only
by analyzing the institutions of the modern world in their actual historical context . . . It
cannot be deduced from logical principles’ (Yack, ‘The Rationality of Hegel’s Concept
of Monarchy’, pp. 711, 712). I believe Yack misunderstands how Hegel’s logic relates to
institutions. For Hegel, logic does not create institutions from nothing: it is a ‘compre-
hension of the present and actual, not the setting up of a world beyond which exists God
knows where’ (PR, Preface, p. 20). Instead, logic enables us to derive meaning from his-
torical institutions. That is, logic alone recognizes the internal rationality of institutions
and knowledge of which are more consistent with certain demands of rationality than
other institutions. Logic then cannot be said to ‘create’ monarchy or any other social
practice. On the contrary, the proper analysis of modern institutions must take into con-
sideration their logical context and not simply their historical context. Of course, today’s
world differs in many respects from Hegel’s time. Perhaps Hegel’s analysis of institu-
tions would be different if democracies were more common at the time of his writing the
Philosophy of Right, instead of monarchy. We can only speculate. That said, this would
not take anything away from the fact that Hegel provides us with a defence of a particular
kind of monarchy, not liberal democracy. Hegel reminds us that ‘philosophy, at any rate,
always comes too late to perform this task . . . the owl of Minerva only begins its flight
with the onset of dusk’ (PR, Preface, p. 23 (modified translation)). Thus, philosophy has
a historical character, as our knowledge of the world is conditioned by the times we live
in: ‘philosophy . . . is its own time grasped in thoughts’ (PR, Preface, p. 21 (modified
translation)). However, I am not convinced that Hegel would prefer modern democracy
to his constitutional monarchy, nor is there clear evidence in support of such a view. (For
example, see Thom Brooks, ‘Plato, Hegel, and Democracy’, Bulletin of the Hegel Soci-
ety of Great Britain, forthcoming.) In any event, my task here is not to speculate on posi-
tions Hegel might have held, but rather to examine a view he clearly held on monarchy, a
view contemporary readers have oft misunderstood. I am grateful to an anonymous ref-
eree for pushing me on this point.
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with the monarch: he alone lends the state an organic unity as an individual
‘one’.45 Hegel says:
The mature differentiation or realization of the Idea means, essentially, that
this subjectivity should grow to be a real moment, an actual existence; and
this reality is the individuality of the monarch alone — the subjectivity of
abstract and final decision existing in one person.46
There are many important aspects of the state’s overall constitution, such as
popular representation, that together make up the ‘differentiation’ of the Idea
of the state. Another important aspect is that the monarch must represent all
citizens, in a way elected representatives cannot.47 Hegel says:
the usual sense in which the term ‘popular sovereignty’ has begun to be used
in recent times is to denote the opposite of that sovereignty which exists in the
monarch. [As conceived] in this opposition [in diesem Gegensatze] [to the
sovereignty of the monarch], popular sovereignty is not one of those con-
fused thoughts which are based on a garbled notion [Vorstellung] of the
people. Without its monarch and that articulation of the whole which is
necessarily and immediately associated with monarchy, the people is a
formless mass.48
In other words, Hegel objects to the use of elections in choosing the head of
state because it runs counter to his view of the state as organic. Elected leaders
are themselves the products of articulated interests where not all interests that
exist in the state may be represented equally. Only with a monarch is this
equality respected.
In this way, the state may act as ‘one’ unity, rather than being led by one
person who may not have been everyone’s choice. For Hegel, subjecting the
head of state to elections entails that whether or not someone is the head of
state becomes a matter of ‘opinion’ and ‘arbitrariness’.49 On the contrary, the
head of state is a necessary part of the rational state and he must be beyond all
particular interests of the citizenry. This is not to say that Hegel denies the
expression of these particular interests in the state. Indeed, the representation
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45 PR, §279. See PR, §§279, 302 and G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans.
J. Sibree (New York, 1956), p. 46.
46 Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §542R (translation modified). See PR, §279R: ‘One
and the same concept — in this case — which begins by being abstract (because it is itself
the beginning), retains its character yet [at the same time] consolidates its determina-
tions . . . and thereby acquires a concrete content. Thus, it is the basic moment of person-
ality, initially abstract in [the sphere of] immediate right, which has continued to develop
through its various forms of subjectivity until at this point, in [the sphere of] absolute
right, in the state, and in the completely concrete objectivity of the will, it becomes the
personality of the state, its certainty of itself.’
47 See Smith, Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism, p. 154.
48 PR, §279R (translation modified).
49 Ibid., §281R.
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of individual interests is reserved for Hegel’s legislative body, the Estates.50
However, it is to say that Hegel’s head of state can simply not be any kind of
elected official, as some commentators have argued.51
The second way in which the monarch best cultivates freedom within the
state is the monarch’s ‘majesty [Majestät]’. Hegel claims the monarch is char-
acterized by its majesty as ‘the actual unity of the state’.52 The monarch is
majestic insofar as he is raised above divisive factions within his state.53 As a
result, the monarch alone gives proper expression to the activities of the
organic state as the power of ‘ultimate decision’: the monarch’s formal deci-
sions are made not only by a particular person, but they represent the deci-
sions of the state as a single entity. For Hegel, the monarch’s formal decisions
are themselves characterized by the statement ‘I will’ (or ‘I will not’).54 It is
important that this part of the will be represented in the state as an organic
unity because otherwise the state would lack its proper form and, thus, free-
dom for the citizenry will suffer in his view.55
Of course, the citizens also suffer if the state fails to decide upon the imple-
mentation of particular laws and public policies. Perhaps Hegel’s point is in
some sense obvious: the state needs someone to declare what the state’s posi-
tions are, whether it be what the state’s planned course of action is in foreign
affairs (‘our state will now impose trade sanctions with North Korea’) or
whether the state will pardon a criminal (‘our state will release John Smith
from prison tomorrow morning’). For Hegel, not only is there a need for
someone to pronounce what the state will (or will not) do; but, in addition, he
believes that only someone who represents the state as a whole can best per-
form this function. Otherwise, what the state ‘wills’ is an expression of a part
of society, rather than all sections of it together.
50 On Hegel’s three Estates, see PR, §§201–6, 298–318.
51 Indeed, several commentators have wrongly believed that an elected prime minis-
ter or a president is at least as acceptable for Hegel here as a monarch. For example, see
Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, p. 186; Paul Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy of
Freedom (New Haven, 1999), p. 314; Hicks, International Law and the Possibility of a
Just World Order, p. 173; Levin and Williams, ‘Inherited Power and Popular Represen-
tation’, p. 106; and Pelczynski, ‘Hegel’s Political Philosophy’, pp. 232–3. These com-
mentators fail to appreciate Hegel’s prohibition against voting for a person who must
represent the state, as well as falsely believe that ‘the monarch is stripped of actual gov-
ernment power’ as I will endeavour to show in the following sections (contra Pelczynski,
‘Hegel’s Political Philosophy’, p. 232).
52 See PR, §281.
53 See ibid. See Brudner, ‘Constitutional Monarchy as the Divine Regime’, p. 127
and Steinberger, Logic and Politics, p. 220.
54 See LNR, §138R and PR, §§275, 300.
55 Thus, Hegel characterizes the monarch as occupying the highest part of the consti-
tution: his office gives the state the organic unity it needs to best satisfy the development
of freedom for all. (See PR, §§275, A, 276A, 278R, 279, R, A, 281, R, A, 285.)
Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2011
For personal use only -- not for reproduction
Finally, we may now wonder just who exactly chooses the monarch. Hegel
tells us that who this person is should not itself be particularly important: all
that is important is that there, in fact, be a monarch as the head of state.56
While a person’s character or abilities as such are not primary grounds for
choosing who should be monarch, it is essential that this person be selected
appropriately. For this reason, we ought not to have a variant of elective mon-
archy, as we have just seen. Here Hegel argues that the monarchy must be
hereditary. As we might expect, his claim is grounded in his logic, rather than
on any prudential considerations.57 His argument is simple, if still obscure:
‘The monarch, therefore, is essentially determined as this individual . . . and
this individual is definite [bestimmt] in an immediate and natural way, i.e. by
his natural birth.’58 Thus, the monarchy should be hereditary because as ‘this’
person (as opposed to his being someone else) he is who he is ‘by his natural
birth’ in the lottery of nature, rather than through elections. For Hegel, this is
not particularly problematic as he says anyone could be a monarch, as ‘the
particular character of [the monarch] is of no significance’.59
In the end, we may remain unpersuaded by Hegel’s justification of the
monarch. It should now be clear that, for Hegel, the logical, rather than
consequentialist or prudential, relevance of certain institutions, including
monarchy, serves as our primary guide to discerning the rationality of our
institutions, such as constitutional monarchy.60 Interpretations of Hegel’s jus-
tification of monarchy that fail to acknowledge the central role of his specula-
tive logic misrepresent his clearly stated justification. If we do not take
seriously Hegel’s use of his logic, then we cannot seriously approach his justi-
fication of monarchy either — however implausible this justification may, in
fact, turn out to be. Perhaps we would be more greatly persuaded by an appeal
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56 See PR, §280A. I will return to the question of how important the monarch is in
Sections III and IV exploring his powers.
57 See PR, §280R. See also G.W.F. Hegel, ‘The German Constitution’, in G.W.F.
Hegel, Political Writings, ed. Laurence Dickey and H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1999), pp.
21, 64.
58 PR, §280.
59 Ibid., §280A.
60 I agree with Michael Petry that ‘the philosophical structure of the Philosophy of
Right is simply part of the overall structure of the Encyclopaedia, and in itself is essen-
tially irrelevant to practical politics’. (M.J. Petry, ‘Hegel and “The Morning Chronicle” ’,
Hegel-Studien, 11 (1976), p. 21. See Duncan Forbes, ‘Introduction’, in G.W.F. Hegel,
Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction: Reason in History, trans.
H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1975), p. xxx.) Thus I agree, in part, with Z.A. Pelczynski,
although I would not agree with him that this means that institutions cannot have any
‘practical significance’. (See Z.A. Pelczynski, ‘An Introductory Essay’, in G.W.F.
Hegel, Hegel’s Political Writings, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford, 1964), p. 135.)
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to prudence, rather than speculative logic, as some have maintained.61 Indeed,
Hegel does not deny that certain institutions, not least monarchy, are pruden-
tially desirable as well as logically necessary, as I have tried to illustrate in this
section.
III
Does It Matter Who is the Monarch?
For Hegel, rational necessity justifies the existence of a hereditary monarch.
While the manner of its justification is highly controversial, there is near
unanimity amongst interpreters that who is the monarch is of little real signifi-
cance.62 This view is readily supported by Hegel’s own remarks on the mon-
arch’s powers. He says:
In a fully organized state . . . all that is required in a monarch is someone to
say ‘yes’ and to dot the ‘i’; for the supreme office should be such that the
particular character of its occupant is of no significance . . . In a well-
ordered monarchy, the objective aspect is solely the concern of the law, to
which the monarch merely has to add his subjective ‘I will’.63
61 This is precisely Mark Tunick’s argument. Even though it is true that ‘Hegel is
unimpressed by nonfoundational justifications’, Tunick also argues, ‘Hegel does consis-
tently maintain that ultimately his metaphysics privileges his version of the concept . . . of
a practice. But this need not prevent us from appropriating Hegel’s interpretation of the
purpose or principle of a practice without privileging it, as Hegel does in giving it a meta-
physical grounding. There is a “nonfoundational” interpretation of Hegel’s claim that
hereditary monarchy is justified by its, as opposed to the, concept.’ (Tunick, ‘Hegel’s
Justification of Hereditary Monarchy’, p. 490.)
62 See Harry Brod, Hegel’s Philosophy of Politics: Idealism, Identity, and Modernity
(Boulder, 1992), pp. 153–4; Brudner, ‘Constitutional Monarchy as the Divine Regime’,
p. 128; Pelczynski, ‘An Introductory Essay’, pp. 100, 126; Pelczynski, ‘Hegel’s Political
Philosophy’, p. 232; Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology, p. 328; Terry Pinkard, Hegel: A
Biography (Cambridge, 2000), p. 486; Paul Redding, ‘Philosophical Republicanism and
Monarchism — and Republican and Monarchical Philosophy — in Kant and Hegel’,
Owl of Minerva, 26 (1994), p. 37; Judith N. Shklar, Freedom and Independence: A Study
of the Political Ideas of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind (Cambridge, 1976), p. 155;
Steinberger, Logic and Politics, pp. 211–12; Tunick, ‘Hegel’s Justification of Hereditary
Monarchy’, pp. 491–2; Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge, 1990),
pp. 13, 282 n.5; and Allen W. Wood, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, in PR, p. xxiv.
63 PR, §280A. This famous passage appears in lecture additions attributed to Hegel
by his students. To my knowledge, only Knowles correctly recognizes a certain tension
between Hegel’s own written sections and additions to these sections attributed to him by
his students from Hegel’s lectures on the Philosophy of Right. Knowles claims we can
discern both a ‘hard reading’ from Hegel’s own sections and a ‘soft reading’ from the
additions attributed to him. Thus, the hard reading emphasizes the ways in which the
monarch is ‘the crucial element in “the legislative power as a whole” ’, having ‘the power
of ultimate decision’; the soft reading emphasizes the monarch’s dependence on execu-
tive officials and that the monarch need do little more than sign his own name to legisla-
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Such remarks have contributed to the common view that Hegel’s monarch is
essentially a rubber stamp divested of any real power. In fact, Bernard Yack
even claims that all Hegel’s monarch need do is ‘take the trouble to be born’
as ‘anyone could do the job’.64 The monarch is thus an essential feature of the
state — otherwise the ‘i’ goes without being dotted — but it is also ‘ultimately
trivial’.65
In turn, this has led some to compare positively Hegel’s monarch with con-
temporary views of the monarch, such as the one found in Britain. For exam-
ple, Findlay says:
[Hegel’s] views of the Monarch’s functions . . . are, in fact, in accord with
modern British constitutional practice. The Monarch is merely the neces-
sary apex of the State-structure, and as such he is merely someone who dots
the i’s, and whose individual character is not of great importance.66
The modern reception of Hegel’s monarch is to treat it as a minor aberration,
whose justification is obscure, whose existence is clearly endorsed, and
whose power is negligible.
I will examine the powers Hegel ascribes to the monarch in domestic and
foreign affairs in the following two sections. However, in this section, I will
address the preliminary issue of whether it matters who is the monarch. As we
have just seen above, Hegel’s answer seems explicit, as he says: ‘the particu-
lar character of [the monarch] is of no significance’.67 Yet, I believe there are
several reasons to believe that Hegel cannot hold this position consistently.
Firstly, he does find a person’s gender to be of great significance. He says:
Women may well be educated, but they are not made for the higher sci-
ences, for philosophy and certain artistic productions which require a uni-
versal element . . . When women are in charge of government, the state is in
danger, for their actions are based not on the demands of universality but on
contingent inclination and opinion.68
Thus, only men should participate in the affairs of state: women are instead
best suited for home life.69 As a result, Hegel’s use of ‘monarch [Monarch]’,
or ‘princely power [die fürstliche Gewalt]’, in the organized state is synony-
mous only with ‘king’ or ‘prince’ and not with ‘queen’ or ‘princess’. Hegel’s
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tion. Of course, the two readings are complementary. (See Knowles, Hegel and the Phi-
losophy of Right, p. 329.)
64 Yack, ‘The Rationality of Hegel’s Concept of Monarchy’, pp. 716, 714.
65 See Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, p. 188.
66 J.N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination (London, 1958), p. 325 (emphasis given).
67 PR, §280A.
68 Ibid., §166A.
69 See LNR, §§77R, 82, R and PR, §§166, R.
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conception of the most just state cannot have a woman as its monarch.70 Still,
we might reject Hegel’s attributing rationality as a characteristic of men
alone. We could say that he ought to have extended this to women as well. In
such a case, we must then acknowledge that while a person’s particular char-
acter does, in fact, matter on the issue of gender for Hegel, we might also say
this should not have mattered for him.
Secondly, it is important that the monarch understand why he makes the
decisions he does for the following reasons. For one thing, as we saw above,
only the monarch has absolute powers of decision. This power of the monarch
is usually considered to be unproblematic, as the monarch here does no more
than simply be the individual who formally makes decisions on behalf of
the state that were essentially decided by various other institutional bodies
administering the state’s activities.71 Therefore, Findlay argues: ‘The func-
tions of the Monarch in the State is simply to take the last decisions . . . The
monarchical majesty resides, further, in the complete groundlessness of these
last decisions.’72 Indeed, we can find Hegel explicitly supporting this reading:
‘Yet with firmly established laws, and a settled organization of the State, what
is left to the sole arbitrament of the monarch is, in point of substance, no great
matter.’73
One problem with this view is that it presupposes that the monarch will
understand not only the rational necessity of the monarchy, but also its proper
function in the state. As we have seen, the monarch is responsible for dotting
i’s and making formal state decisions. Hegel does not argue that the monarch
can make state decisions arbitrarily. For example, he says:
But it is more difficult to grasp this ‘I will’ as a person, for this [formula]
does not imply that the monarch may act arbitrarily: on the contrary, he is
bound by the concrete content of the advice he receives, and if the constitu-
70 Instead, the women’s ‘substantial vocation’ is not to run a state, but to remain in
‘the family’ as mothers and caregivers in a traditional role (see PR, §166).
71 See Deranty, ‘Hegel’s Parliamentarianism’, pp. 118–19; Franco, Hegel’s Philoso-
phy of Freedom, p. 316 and G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, I,
trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford, 1975), pp. 193–4. Renato Cristi argues that Hegel’s monarch
has absolute power, at least insofar as only ‘the monarch is granted absolute powers of
decision’. (See Cristi, ‘The Hegelsche Mitte and Hegel’s Monarch’, p. 608. See
Jean-Philippe Deranty, ‘Hegel’s Parliamentarianism: A New Perspective on Hegel’s
Theory of Political Institutions’, Owl of Minerva, 32 (2001), p. 115.)
72 Findlay, Hegel, p. 324 (emphasis given). See Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philoso-
phy, p. 214 and Pelczynski, ‘Hegel’s Political Philosophy’, pp. 232–3. See also the dis-
cussion of the monarch’s limited powers as ‘ethical’ in Stephen Houlgate, ‘The Unity of
Theoretical and Practical Spirit in Hegel’s Concept of Freedom’, Review of Metaphysics,
48 (1995), p. 879.
73 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, p. 456. See LNR, §138.
Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2011
For personal use only -- not for reproduction
tion is firmly established, he often has nothing more to do than to sign his
name. But this name is important.74
Other interpreters have also been aware of this limit. Peter Steinberger says:
‘The freedom of the monarch . . . requires that he be bound and limited by that
which reason prescribes; and it seems certain that reason prescribes actions
aimed at promoting the good health of the organism as a whole.’75
The second reason it is important that the monarch understand why he
makes the decisions he does is because it would appear that hereditary monar-
chy might violate a more general principle deduced from his logic: the right of
all individuals to possess subjective freedom. For Hegel, subjective freedom
is the freedom of individuals to make decisions for themselves, such as their
career, and it must not be threatened by the state.76 In fact, Hegel says:
In Plato’s republic, subjective freedom is not yet recognised, because indi-
viduals still have their tasks assigned to them by the authorities [Obrigkeit].
In many oriental states, this assignment is governed by birth. But subjective
freedom, which must be respected, requires freedom of choice on the part of
individuals.77
Thus, the potential problem is that the monarch substantively lacks subjective
freedom insofar as his main occupation is chosen for him as a hereditary
office: he lacks the freedom to make this decision for himself, as it is naturally
determined for him instead.
Perhaps Hegel’s rejoinder is to say:
The right of the subjective will is that whatever it is to recognize as valid
should be perceived by it as good, and that it should be held responsible for
an action . . . as right or wrong, good or evil, legal or illegal, according to its
cognizance [Kenntnis] of the value which that action has in this objectiv-
ity.78
Hegel may remark that while it is true that the title of monarch is chosen for
the natural heir, this heir will freely choose to accept being monarch if he is
able to recognize the rational necessity of the monarch’s office. That is, while
on the one hand the heir inherits the monarchy and appears to have little
choice in the matter, it is also true, on the other hand, that the heir would freely
choose to become monarch if he can recognize its rational necessity. Indeed,
the monarch cannot choose to abdicate the throne, but must inherit it.79
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74 PR, §279A.
75 Steinberger, Logic and Politics, p. 221.
76 See PR, §§153, 185R, 189, 262A.
77 Ibid., §262A.
78 Ibid, §132. See ibid., §§124R, 153.
79 As the hereditary succession of kings prevents ‘the formation of factions’, the
monarch may not have the choice of abdicating the throne. See PR, §§281R, 286 and in
particular 286R: ‘Thus, public freedom in general and a hereditary succession guarantee
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It is most important to note that in order for the heir to make this choice as
an act of subjective freedom, he must understand the choice he is making:
subjective freedom is not the liberty to simply do whatever one pleases. Thus,
Hegel’s institution of hereditary monarchy runs the risk of violating the right
of subjective freedom unless the heir to the throne can understand the rational
necessity of the monarchy. If he can do this, then he will understand that his
subjective freedom is best expressed in his choosing to inherit the monar-
chy.80 Who the monarch is then matters insofar as it is essential that he under-
stands why he must inherit the throne or risk failing to attain his own subjec-
tive freedom.81
As a result, we see again that the personal character of the monarch is far
from unimportant for Hegel. Not only must the monarch be male (on grounds
we have reason to reject), but the monarch must be able to grasp the rational
necessity of the monarchy in addition to the necessity of the monarch for the
proper organization of the state. This is particularly crucial for states in the
process of adopting Hegel’s hereditary monarchy. As Pelczynski is right to
say: ‘The difference between a limited and an unlimited government, between
a constitutional and an authoritarian monarchy, is the difference between rul-
ing within a rational framework and striving to establish it first.’82 Here the
each other reciprocally, and their association [Zusammenhang] is absolute, because pub-
lic freedom is the rational constitution, and the hereditary character of the power of the
sovereign is, as has already been shown, the moment inherent in its concept.’ The natural
succession of the throne is to be supervised by Hegel’s legislative body, the Estates (see
LNR, §157). If the monarch should die without an heir, then Hegel tells us that ‘the estates
of the realm must see to it that a new dynasty ascends the throne without disturbances’
(LNR, §157R). However, it would appear that the complete rationality of the state is
assured only when the monarchy is inherited and chosen by the lottery of nature, rather
than the arbitrary selection of estates or the citizenry.
80 Cristi argues the opposite case: ‘He is allowed full enjoyment of his subjectivity
and freedom. But he is alone in this. Only he can dwell in liberal self-determination.’
(F.R. Cristi, ‘Hegel and Roman Liberalism’, History of Political Thought, V (1984),
p. 294.)
81 We might be led to think then that there is a conflict between this picture of a mon-
arch who must both satisfy a certain minimum of rational competence alongside his ‘nat-
uralness’ (e.g. his enjoying his office by inheritance). For Hegel, these ought not to con-
flict, although they may. The average citizen of the just state will each recognize the
necessity of the monarch, the need for him to inherit his office, and the importance of his
decisions for the state. To this extent, any rational citizen born into the monarchy should
welcome his position. Of course, Hegel’s state may be rational, but fall well short of actu-
ality (see PR, Preface, p. 20). I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pushing me on
this point.
82 Pelczynski, ‘An Introductory Essay’, p. 111. He adds at p. 111 n.1: ‘Oddly enough,
Locke reached a similar conclusion in the Second Treatise of Civil Government. In para-
graphs 157 and 158 he justifies an arbitrary use of the royal prerogative to abolish rotten
boroughs on the ground of rationality and concludes that “whatsoever cannot but be
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authoritarian monarch must be in a position to know when the time has come
to limit his own powers and devolve power to other institutions in an organic
state.83 He must perform this task perhaps without the benefit of a cabinet, as
the latter is a characteristic of constitutional, not authoritarian, monarchy.
Again, who the monarch is, in fact, does matter — despite Hegel’s sugges-
tions to the contrary.
IV
The Domestic Powers of the Monarch
Is the monarch essentially a powerless rubber stamp, as virtually all contem-
porary interpreters claim? To begin with, Hegel is perhaps surprisingly criti-
cal of rubber-stamp monarchs. For example, he says: ‘In England the king is
this ultimate apex too, but the constitution as a whole reduces him virtually to
a cipher. Since 1692 there has never been a case of the king’s vetoing a parlia-
mentary decree . . . this inner unity of the concept must also be actualized.’84
Hegel’s position here is not that monarchs actively ought to veto legislation;
but, rather, he does seem to think the monarch should have some meaningful
involvement in the affairs of state.85 Yet, it may seem that Hegel’s criticism is
misplaced, for as we have just seen, he also argues that the organized state
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acknowledged to be of advantage to the society and people in general upon just and last-
ing measures, will always, when done, justify itself ”.’
83 It is tempting to suppose that Hegel’s monarch is a variety of philosopher-king:
each must possess knowledge of governance in order to rule, as well as take their privi-
leged political position as a birthright. There are many differences, not least that Hegel’s
monarch recognizes the need for himself to rule, whereas Plato’s philosopher-king reluc-
tantly pursues his task, even risking his life to do so. (See Thom Brooks, ‘Knowledge and
Power in Plato’s Political Thought’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 14
(2006), pp. 51–77.) In addition, Plato’s philosopher-kings rule with absolute power,
while Hegel’s monarch rules in tandem with his cabinet and elected legislature. Whilst
both find privileging knowledge in governance important, they each do so in different
ways. I am grateful to Ali Mandipour for pushing me on this point.
84 LNR, §133R. Hegel complains elsewhere that, in his view, the English monarchy
is ‘too weak’. (See G.W.F. Hegel, ‘On the English Reform Bill’, in Hegel, Political Writ-
ings, ed. Dickey and Nisbet, p. 248. See also ibid., p. 261: ‘Consequently, the monarch’s
share in the executive power is more illusory than real, and its substance lies with Parlia-
ment.’)
85 It is undeniable that Hegel carves out an autonomous sphere for the monarchy, as
he does for other parts of his rational state (see PR, §286). This sphere of action (detailed
in what follows) is a space where monarchy can act. Thus, there is an autonomous sphere
of influence for monarchy and Hegel nowhere conceives of the office as relatively pow-
erless. The question then becomes what lies in this monarch’s realm of political activity,
an area that most scholars have found little, if any, space for the monarch to exert real
influence. What follows will be my attempt to demonstrate that this space is wider and
further reaching than previously has been thought, short of an endorsement of totalitari-
anism as per Popper’s classic assessment. I am most grateful to Iain Hampsher-Monk for
suggesting this point.
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requires no more of the monarch beyond ‘someone to say “yes” and to dot the
“i”; for the supreme office should be such that the particular character of its
occupant is of no significance’.86
There can be no doubt that Hegel’s monarch is not fascist nor totalitarian.87
However, I believe the monarch is far more powerful than commonly recog-
nized. It is true that the monarch does not choose formal state decisions purely
at his own discretion. Instead, these decisions are made by the monarch with
the aid of his cabinet [Ministerium]. Hegel refers to the monarch with his cabi-
net as ‘the power of the sovereign [die fürstliche Gewalt]’.88 The cabinet is
designed to moderate the effect of the monarch’s particular dispositions on
the business of the state. It plays an important role in Hegel’s state as without
moderation the monarch might threaten the rationality of the state through
improper state decision-making.89 Rather than make decisions based upon his
own personal assessment of what rationality demands as such, the monarch is
instead advised on such matters by his cabinet.90
As discussed in the previous section, I believe the monarch must possess a
certain character, namely, the ability to recognize rational necessity. The
importance of the monarch’s cabinet is that it may help to ensure the monarch
chooses wisely. Indeed, it is too often overlooked by interpreters how impor-
tant the decisions are that the monarch and his cabinet must make in the
domestic sphere. Firstly, the monarch and his cabinet propose all pieces of
legislation to be approved by the legislature.91 The legislature does not pro-
pose legislative bills.92 It is important to note that neither the monarch — nor
86 PR, §280A.
87 See ibid., §265A: ‘It has often been said that the end of the state is the happiness of
its citizens. This is certainly true, for if their welfare is deficient, if their subjective ends
are not satisfied, and if they do not find that the state as such is the means to this satisfac-
tion, the state itself stands on an insecure footing.’ While someone, such as Hitler or Sta-
lin, might claim to agree with this statement, it is clear that the ‘happiness’ and ‘subjec-
tive ends’ of all their citizens were not satisfied in fact. By contrast, for Hegel, both must
be fulfilled within an organic unity if the state is to become just.
88 See LNR, §138 and PR, §§275, 279–80, 283. ‘Die fürstliche Gewalt’ may also be
translated as ‘the princely power’.
89 See LNR, §140, R.
90 Ibid. Elsewhere Hegel adds that in addition to ‘the executive civil servants’ there
are also ‘higher consultative bodies’ which ‘necessarily work together in groups, and
they converge in their supreme heads who are in touch with the monarch himself’ (PR,
§289). Hegel suggests that these ‘higher consultative bodies’ are ‘corporations’ (see PR,
§289R.)
91 See LNR, §149R: ‘Legislative proposals must therefore emanate from the sover-
eign . . . the initiative for laws rests essentially with the power of the sovereign. ’
92 It is a curiosity why exactly the legislature can only accept or reject bills, not pro-
pose them — we might suppose that if the legislature can perform the former duty, it can
perform the latter. This is not true with Hegel’s count and he does not offer a clear argu-
ment why this is the case. The closest we might come to this is his earlier claim that par-
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any member of his cabinet — propose legislation on their own either. Instead,
whatever legislation the monarch chooses to endorse can only be brought to
the legislature for consideration if, and only if, ‘the competent minister’ in the
cabinet consents to his doing so.93 Hegel says:
Since it is the ministers who are answerable for the power of the sovereign,
there can be no action by the ruler determined in a merely personal manner
(e.g., by the monarch’s subjective environment, namely the court); his
every decision must be signed by the competent ministers.94
On the one hand, this passage makes clear the limited powers of the monarch.
He cannot make any decision without the prior approval of the responsible
member of his cabinet. However, on the other hand, the monarch cannot be
held accountable himself and removed from office.95 Nor is it possible for him
to more or less rule as he likes provided he takes the extra effort of frequently
replacing his cabinet ministers, thus finding someone who will sign onto his
decisions. The monarch may not simply choose anyone, say, his friends, for
example. Rather, the monarch may only select ministers from a given pool of
qualified applicants.96 Ideally, all potential cabinet ministers would offer the
same general advice.
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ticular interests should be harmonized with the universal interest, but not the other way
round. When applied to lawmaking, the legislature (representing particular interests) are
charged with harmonizing themselves with the universal interest (represented by the uni-
versal class, the cabinet) and, thus, the legislature are charged with no more accepting or
rejecting proposed laws from the cabinet (see PR, §261R). Instead, the best argument we
get is found at LNR, §149R: ‘if the assembly formally proposes the laws itself, this
implies its independence from the power of the sovereign . . . if the assembly also had the
power to propose legislation, it would be capable of embarrassing the state power
through its demands’. In addition, the legislature is unable to consult with its constituents
when deciding to pass or veto proposed legislation so that they remain ‘equally bound to
foster the universal interest’ (LNR, §149R). Hegel’s thought seems to be that while par-
ticular interests are represented in the legislature, the legislature ‘may not vote and act in
the sense of a single city or class, but must vote and act in the sense of the whole’ (LNR,
§149R). I am extremely grateful to Bob Stern for pushing me on this point.
93 See LNR, §140.
94 Ibid.
95 See ibid., §139.
96 For example, G.W.F. Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts: Die Mitschriften Wannen-
mann (Heidelberg 1817–1818) und Homeyer (Berlin 1818–1819), ed. K.-H. Ilting
(Stuttgart, 1983), pp. 166–7, reprinted in Wood’s editorial note to §283 in PR, p. 466:
‘[But] the guarantee of the Estates of the realm in particular requires the monarch to take
up suitable subjects, and requires that the ministers be chosen on the basis of talent, vir-
tue, rectitude, and diligence. The Prince Regent [of England, later George IV, governing
during the incompetency of his father George III] who had his friends in the opposition
party and his enemies in the ministry, could not, when he took up the regency, make his
friends into ministers. Hence the French ministry [in 1817 under Louis XVIII] is made up
of enemies of the royal family, the ultra-loyalists. These examples show that the choice
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Unlike the monarch who is answerable to no one, members of his cabinet
must answer to the legislature.97 It is thought that cabinet ministers can be best
held accountable for the advice they offer to the monarch if they debate
openly proposals approved by the monarch and themselves.98 Furthermore,
Hegel claims it is the duty of the legislature to question cabinet ministers in
public on state matters.99 His reason is that he thinks questioning ministers
will serve as a sufficient check on the powers of both the executive and the
sovereign.100 In addition, such debates provide the public with ‘a great specta-
cle of outstanding educational value to the citizens’ in matters of the state.101
The monarch and his ministers cannot always guarantee success with the legis-
lation they propose. However, only they can choose what might — and also
what might not — become the state’s laws.
A second important responsibility of the monarch is the pardoning of any
criminals.102 Here Hegel notes that the courts will often make recommenda-
tions to the monarch as to which criminals should be pardoned.103 However,
only the monarch may pardon criminals, as long as he gains the consent of the
relevant minister. There are no limitations on who or how many can be par-
doned provided there is ministerial consent.104 What is distinctly different
about granting pardons from proposing legislation is that the monarch only
needs the consent of the relevant minister: the monarch does not need the
approval of the legislature. Of course, the monarch cannot pardon whomever
he pleases as the responsible cabinet minister might object to inappropriate
pardons, but his say remains significant for any decisions.
How this might be so requires us briefly to look at how the monarch is
thought to properly act as a check on his cabinet. One way in which Hegel’s
monarch exercises control over the advice he receives is by holding the mem-
bers of his cabinet responsible for their advice.105 He does this through his
of ministers in a well-constituted monarchy is not a matter of the mere arbitrary will of
the regent.’
97 See LNR, §140 and Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom, p. 317.
98 See PR, §284. It is important to note that this does not suggest that the relevant
minister is responsible for getting the monarch to agree with him on what should become
law, as this passage is equally suggestive that ministers may be held accountable if they
fail to convince the monarch to avoid moving forward with a bill proposal.
99 See PR, §315A.
100 LNR, §149R.
101 PR, §315A. See LNR, §154R.
102 See LNR, §139 and PR, §§282, R, A.
103 See LNR, §139.
104 It is worth noting that, for Hegel, pardoned individuals are still technically crimi-
nals: ‘the pardon does not state that he has not committed a crime’ (PR, §282A).
105 See ibid., §295. For Ken Westphal, this raises a possible ‘internal weakness’. He
says: ‘Hegel defended an inherited monarchy in part because no talent is needed to sign
legislation, since the cabinet ministers are experts and are accountable for the entire con-
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right to select and dismiss cabinet members at his discretion.106 Of course, the
cabinet plays an important role in matters of state and, thus, it is important that
the best persons are chosen. Yet, who is chosen — and who is overlooked —
for cabinet membership is a matter of some discretion for the monarch, within
certain limits.107 Moreover, the role of cabinet ministers is only to advise the
monarch on matters of state, grant consent to his decisions when appropriate,
and debate proposals in the legislature. They cannot make any executive deci-
sions on their own.
In addition, cabinet ministers are far from equal partners with the monarch,
as ministers can be dismissed at the monarch’s discretion. The only check
ministers have — their right to refuse consent to the monarch’s executive
decisions — is particularly weak as the monarch has the potential ability to
dismiss uncooperative ministers and replace them with persons more favour-
able to his own policy preferences. We can now see the relevance of this for
the monarch’s ability to pardon. If the legislature need not be consulted and
the monarch need only gain the consent of the relevant minister who he can
replace at will, it seems possible for the monarch to replace ministers until
they agree with what the monarch wants. The monarch’s ability to pardon is
thus a much greater power than it might appear at first blush.
Moreover, the monarch has the right to intervene in any instances where
executive officials abuse their position.108 As with pardons, the monarch need
only gain the consent of the relevant minister, whom he can replace at will.
The legislature need not be consulted. This right of the monarch is perhaps
more worrisome than his right to pardon, as it allows him to have significant
control on who makes up the executive branch. In addition, the monarch
exerts absolute control on who is allowed to serve at the very top of the execu-
tive branch, his cabinet.
It is worth noting that the monarch’s ability to select ministers is an impor-
tant check on ministers. Hegel tells us that the potential ministers a monarch
has to choose from a pool of candidates will each satisfy some minimum
degree of competency. The only possible check on the ability of bureaucrats
to successfully educate potential ministers for political office is the monarch
through his ability to appoint and remove ministers at will.
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tent of the law (ibid., §§283, 284). But he also counted on the monarch’s watchful eye
from above . . . to hold the ministers accountable (ibid., §295). He can’t have it both
ways.’ (Kenneth Westphal, ‘The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of
Right’, in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge,
1993), p. 262.)
106 See LNR, §140 and PR, §283.
107 See note 82 and, in addition, PR, §283: ‘The appointment of individuals for [cabi-
net membership] and their dismissal from office fall within the [competence of the] unre-
stricted arbitrary will of the monarch.’
108 See PR, §§295, R.
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Finally, it is important to note that Hegel’s monarch differs rather dramati-
cally from contemporary monarchs. For example, Queen Elizabeth II must
sign laws in order for them to be enacted and appoints ministers to Her Maj-
esty’s Cabinet. However, when the Queen agrees to laws it is the end of the
process: when Hegel’s monarch agrees to a law it is the beginning of the legis-
lative process as bills are sent then to the legislature afterwards for ratifica-
tion. Furthermore, the cabinet, for Hegel, is elected by only one person — the
monarch. The Queen has no substantive say in who might serve as ministers:
she does not appoint ministers until the Prime Minister informs her who will
serve as ministers. For Hegel, the decision on who should serve is taken by the
monarch, not the people. I would not wish here to defend Hegel’s justification
of his monarch, only to point out yet again how the person of the monarch is
not without consequence for the state and most certainly more powerful than
the Queen, despite much commentary to the contrary.
It should be clear that Hegel’s monarch is far from a rubber stamp divested
of any real power in domestic affairs. He is not only beyond censure and
unimpeachable, but the monarch alone selects members of the cabinet. In con-
sultation with his cabinet, the monarch proposes all legislation for the state,
pardons certain criminals, and intervenes in cases where executive officials
abuse their office. In order for the monarch to be bound ‘by that which reason
prescribes’, he must surely have some understanding of what reason pre-
scribes. Moreover, this knowledge must play some role in the monarch’s
freely given consent to accept his inherited position: otherwise he would lack
subjective freedom which is a right of all individuals in the state. In addition,
if the monarch is to hold his cabinet members responsible, then he must be
able to vet potential candidates for cabinet positions as well as the quality of
the advice he is given. The state will fail to be fully rational should he be mis-
taken on who should serve in the cabinet or how the state should govern in
light of the counsel he receives. Finally, the monarch’s particular characteris-
tics are far from irrelevant, despite Hegel’s occasional assertions to the con-
trary. Thus, the monarch’s choices matter across a number of substantive
areas, a position very different from the view of him as a rubber stamp sug-
gested by traditional interpretations. Indeed, the fact that the monarch is not a
rubber stamp may well explain why Hegel discusses the monarch’s role in the
state more than we might normally expect.
V
The Monarch’s Role in Foreign Affairs
The powers of the monarch in foreign affairs have been almost entirely over-
looked by interpreters.109 Most interpreters deal with the monarch’s role in
109 Whilst he is untroubled by Hegel’s use of the monarch in foreign affairs, perhaps
the best understanding of the monarch in international affairs is David Boucher, Political
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foreign affairs only in passing.110 Indeed, most of the discussion of Hegel’s
theory of international relations hardly mentions the role of the monarch at
all.111
Perhaps the primary reason for taking little notice of the monarch here is
due to the traditional interpretation that claims that he is a trivial player in for-
eign affairs. As we saw above, most interpreters view the monarch as an insig-
nificant rubber stamp. Thus, Steven Smith argues that we ‘need not expect the
monarch to be a wise man’.112 Instead, the monarch’s cabinet will take care of
all matters of the state with due care. This position is not dissimilar to Ray-
mond Plant, when he says that ‘[t]he monarch does not himself formulate the
policy of the state’.113 These generally representative views hold that the mon-
arch may, as stated by Pelczynski, ‘more or less withdraw from active politi-
cal life and leave the day-to-day conduct of government to a chancellor or
Cabinet’.114
I believe that interpreters have misunderstood the monarch’s significant
powers in foreign affairs, in addition to his powers in domestic affairs. For
Hegel, the monarch and his cabinet represent the state in all matters of foreign
relations.115 He says:
The outward orientation of the state derives from the fact that it is an indi-
vidual subject. Its relationship with other states therefore comes under the
power of the [monarch and his cabinet], who therefore has direct and sole
114 T. BROOKS
Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present (Oxford, 1998), pp.
330–53, as well as Thom Brooks, ‘Hegel’s Theory of International Politics: Reply to Jae-
ger’, Review of International Studies, 30 (2004), pp. 149–52 and Brooks, Hegel’s Politi-
cal Philosophy, Chapter VIII.
110 See Brod, Hegel’s Philosophy of Politics, pp. 155–6; Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy
of Freedom, p. 317; Pelczynski, ‘An Introductory Essay’, p. 105; Pelczynski, ‘Hegel’s
Political Philosophy’, p. 232; and Yack, ‘The Rationality of Hegel’s Concept of Monar-
chy’, p. 713.
111 For example, see Robert Arp, ‘Hegel and the Prospect of Perpetual Peace’,
Diálogos, 74 (1999), pp. 71–100; Kimberly Hutchings, International Political Theory:
Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era (London, 1999), pp. 91–120; Hans-Martin Jaeger,
‘Hegel’s Reluctant Realism and the Transnationalisation of Civil Society’, Review of
International Studies, 28 (2002), pp. 497–517; Adriaan Peperzak, ‘Hegel contra Hegel in
His Philosophy of Right: The Contradictions of International Politics’, Journal of the
History of Philosophy, 32 (1994), pp. 241–63; Mark Shelton, ‘The Morality of Peace:
Kant and Hegel on the Grounds for Ethical Ideals’, Review of Metaphysics, 54 (2000),
pp. 379–408.
112 See Smith, Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism, p. 155 and Tunick, ‘Hegel’s Justifica-
tion of Hereditary Monarchy’, p. 492. See also Steinberger, Logic and Politics, p. 225:
‘there is a sense in which, for Hegel, anyone could be king. The king need not be particu-
larly intelligent or insightful, saintly or devout.’
113 See Raymond Plant, Hegel: An Introduction (Oxford, 2nd edn., 1983), p. 173.
114 Pelczynski, ‘An Introductory Essay’, p. 104.
115 See Hegel, ‘The German Constitution’, p. 63 and LNR, §139.
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responsibility for the command of the armed forces, for the conduct of rela-
tions with other states through ambassadors, etc., and for making war and
peace, and [entering into] concluding treaties of other kinds [und andere
Traktate zu schließen].116
The monarch and his cabinet as ‘the power of the sovereign’ [die fürstliche
Gewalt] represent the state because, for Hegel, states relate to one another as
independent, individual subjects.117 Thus, Hegel holds a classic realist view of
international relations.118
One consequence of Hegel’s realism is that he does not believe that states
can be bound by international law. Instead, such laws and treaties can be
agreed to or withdrawn from at will.119 As a result, states find themselves in
varying degrees of conflict without a supreme authority to resolve any dis-
putes.120 Where disputes arise, states may only be able to settle their differ-
ences through war.121 While Hegel certainly does not celebrate war, neither
does he view it as something that states should avoid at all costs.122 In fact, he
argues against perpetual peace amongst states and claims that states benefit
from occasionally entering into war with other states: ‘Wars are like winds
upon the sea; without them the water would become foul, and so it is with the
state’.123 Hegel says further: ‘Not only do peoples emerge from wars with
added strength, but nations [Nationen] troubled by civil dissension gain inter-
nal peace as a result of wars with their external enemies.’124 In war, the state
tries to prevent its citizens from focusing exclusively on their individual
well-being.125 Thus, states become stagnant without occasionally entering
into war, as war reminds citizens of their membership of the state.
It is important to note that if the monarch and his cabinet alone decide mat-
ters of international affairs, they alone decide whether or not the state should
enter into war. The usual check on the sovereign power’s actions — the public
debates between cabinet ministers and the legislature — is lacking in these
instances. This is because all decisions of foreign affairs do not require any
116 PR, §329 (translation modified).
117 See ibid., §§329, 331.
118 See Brooks, ‘Hegel’s Theory of International Relations’, pp. 149–52. In addition,
see PR, §§333, R.
119 See PR, §333.
120 See ibid., §§333R, 339R.
121 See LNR, §162 and PR, §334.
122 See PR, §324R; Hegel, ‘The German Constitution’, p. 49; and G.W.F. Hegel, ‘On
the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law’, in Hegel, Political Writings, ed. Dickey
and Nisbet, p. 141.
123 LNR, §160R.
124 PR, §324A.
125 See LNR, §162R: ‘Yet without war peoples sink into merely private life — the
security and weakness that makes them an easy prey for other peoples. War is something
ethically necessary.’
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legislative authority, unlike many decisions of domestic affairs which do.
Instead, the legislature can do no more than approve funds for use in war, as
only the legislative branch of government has the power to collect tax and
endorse its spending.126 If the monarch were wealthy enough to finance a war
that the legislature was unwilling to fund, a state may still go to war despite
the legislature’s refusal to fund it.127
In addition, as we saw above, the usual check on the monarch’s power is his
need for a signature from the responsible cabinet member on all relevant acts
taken on behalf of the state. Yet, if the relevant minister refused to support the
monarch, the monarch could simply remove the minister and replace him with
another at the monarch’s discretion until he finds someone more willing to
support military action.128 Thus, what checks there are on the monarch’s pow-
ers to wage war appear to be somewhat weak. This is equally true with the
drafting of treaties between the monarch’s state and another: these decisions
are made by the monarch with the signature of the responsible cabinet mem-
ber, whom the monarch can replace at will. As a result, the monarch’s powers
to enter the state into treaties or war are relatively unchecked beyond the need
to gain the responsible cabinet member’s signature and inability to levy taxes
without approval from the legislature.
Perhaps even more worrisome for modern readers are the consequences of
military action. Of course, innocent people on both sides will suffer in some
way from war and neither side may gain in any identifiable way. These con-
flicts may be also unpopular.129 In addition, Hegel says that ‘[o]nly in the case
of danger to the state may it be necessary to transfer more power to a single
individual [i.e. the monarch], but never in peacetime’.130 Thus, the monarch’s
powers in foreign affairs appear both great and relatively unchecked. More-
over, in pursuing military conflict, the monarch may justify the temporary
expansion of his powers. As before, it is again hard to reconcile this view with
his oft-cited passages where he claims that the personality of the monarch
116 T. BROOKS
126 See ibid., §§157, R.
127 The only check on the monarch and his cabinet’s ability to wage war levied by the
legislature is the latter’s ability to control state revenue. If revenue was available from
independent wealth and not ‘extraordinary’ taxation to fund a war, then this legislative
check would not have the ability to prevent in every case the monarch and his cabinet
from waging war. Without the need to gain approval for necessary funds, the legislature
plays no part in decisions to go to war.
128 The monarch is not entitled to choose absolutely anyone at all (see note 96).
129 See PR, §329A. As the monarch is not an elected representative of the people, it
seems clear that not every decision he takes will be popular. It is, however, equally clear
that every decision of the rational state must make the state’s true interests its priority.
130 LNR, §143R. It is impossible to imagine the United Kingdom handing all power
to the Queen in a similar crisis, further underscoring the greater power of Hegel’s mon-
arch over the British monarch.
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‘makes no difference’ and ‘has no influence’.131 On the contrary, who the
monarch is and how he exercises judgments on behalf of the state seem to be
of significant importance.
Despite the fact that a monarch can pursue whatever course of state
action in world affairs he might like, Hegel does not believe a monarch
ought to pursue whatever actions take his fancy. Indeed, the relations
between states should not be arbitrary. One of the reasons Hegel believes
the sovereign power should make decisions relating to war and peace is
because it is most likely to pursue rational ends, rather than its particular
passions. He says:
But if it is imagined that sovereign princes [Fürsten] and cabinets are more
subject to passion than parliaments are, and if the attempt is accordingly
made to transfer responsibility for war and peace into the hands of the latter,
it must be replied that whole nations are often more prone to enthusiasms
and subject to passion than their rulers are.132
In fact, Hegel criticizes England for deciding matters of war and peace in its
Parliament. He claims that popular decisions to go to war in England’s past
were later found to be ‘useless and unnecessary’ and decided upon ‘without
calculating the cost’.133 Popular sentiment is a poor guide to what a state
should do and ‘the complexities’ of international relations become ‘so deli-
cate’ that an unelected body guided by reason, rather than public passions, is
best suited for making judgments in foreign affairs.134
It should be clear that we cannot discuss Hegel’s views of international
relations without noting the powerful presence of the monarch. Here the mon-
arch’s discretion is greater than in domestic affairs as both his decisions and
the advice of his cabinet do not face any scrutiny. Even more, who the mon-
arch is matters as not only are all state decisions in foreign affairs his ultimate
judgment, but when the state enters into military conflict his overall powers
increase. The picture that Hegel paints of the monarch is not that of a totalitar-
ian leader, as the monarch ought not to pursue policies that do not accord with
the state’s true interests. Indeed, if the monarch were to act in this way, this
will become evident in Hegel’s view should the state fail or be conquered.
Furthermore, we may well not be entirely convinced as modern readers that
the monarch should have the powers that Hegel ascribes to him. Nevertheless,
it is clear that Hegel’s constitutional monarch is not a relatively powerless
rubber stamp.
131 Ibid.
132 PR, §329A.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
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VI
Conclusion
As we have seen above, Hegel famously says:
In a fully organised state . . . all that is required in a monarch is someone to
say ‘yes’ and to dot the ‘i’; for the supreme office should be such that the
particular character of its occupant is of no significance. Whatever other
qualities the monarch has in addition to his role of ultimate decision belong
to [the sphere of] particularity [Partikularität], which must not be allowed
to affect the issue.135
My contention here is that this oft-cited statement of the monarch is inconsis-
tent with Hegel’s overall view of the monarch. The particular character of the
monarch is of great significance. Not only must the monarch be male, but he
must recognize the rationality of his inheriting the throne. In addition, his
good judgment is crucial in vetting potential cabinet members as well as their
advice. The monarch’s judgments are nowhere more important than in for-
eign affairs where he decides matters of war and peace alone with his relevant
cabinet minister whom he personally selects. Indeed, if ‘[i]n its institutions
the state must be a temple of reason’, then the monarch’s rational decision-
making is one necessary part.136
Terry Pinkard says:
One of the problems involved in doing the history of philosophy is reinter-
preting past philosophers in such a way that the relevance of their work to
contemporary discussion can become clear. In doing so one often finds that
certain doctrines to which a philosopher himself attached great significance
may not be central to a particular line of his argument.137
It is most often thought by interpreters that Hegel’s monarch is a relatively
unimportant feature of his theory of the state. On the contrary, I have demon-
strated that, in his own terms, Hegel is right to give the monarch the signifi-
cance he does and that, in turn, this significance is far greater than has been
recognized. The constitutional monarch is a necessary part of Hegel’s rational
118 T. BROOKS
135 Ibid., §280A.
136 Here there might appear to be some relation between Hegel’s monarch and
Plato’s philosopher-king. There are, however, several notable differences. Unlike
Plato’s philosopher-king, any male can become monarch. I am inclined to think this per-
son would need some philosophical training to ascertain the rational, but there is no
defence of natural aristocracy as we find with philosopher-kings. In addition, the mon-
arch does not rule reluctantly, but freely chooses his office, in keeping with the exercise
of his subjective freedom. Thus, while both Hegel and Plato’s states depend on rulers
capable of sound judgment, the monarch and philosopher-king have little else in com-
mon.
137 Terry Pinkard, ‘The Logic of Hegel’s Logic’, in Hegel, ed. Michael Inwood
(Oxford, 1985), p. 85.
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state that is simply too powerful for interpreters to continue to overlook or dis-
count. He is anything but a rubber stamp.138
Thom Brooks UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE
138 This article benefited from discussions held at the annual conferences of the Clas-
sical Association and the Global Studies Association, each held in Newcastle, and that of
the Hegel Society of Great Britain held in Oxford. I am grateful to Chris Bennett, Fabian
Freyenhagen, Christopher Hookway, Stephen Houlgate, Tim Kelsall, Dudley Knowles,
Ali Mandipour, Kathryn Wilkinson and, most especially, Iain Hampsher-Monk, Bob
Stern, Leif Wenar and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts.
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